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In December 2012, a group of political economists, political scientists, and political 
sociologists gathered at the University of Sydney to consider the effects of inequalities 
in wealth and power on contemporary Indonesian politics.1 The lively and critical 
discussion over two days centered on competing interpretations of oligarchy in 
Indonesian democracy by scholars representing a range of theoretical traditions. This 
special issue is the product of these discussions.
As Jeffrey Winters noted at the workshop, "beyond oligarchy" could mean one of 
two things in assessments of the state of Indonesian politics. On the one hand, it could 
refer to a time when oligarchs were no longer politically dominant. On the other, it
1 The workshop was co-hosted by the Department of Indonesian Studies at the University of Sydney, the 
Sydney Southeast Asia Centre, and the Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Michele Ford's co-convenorship 
of the workshop and co-editorship of this special issue was undertaken as part of an ARC Discovery 
Project (DP120100654).
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could refer to a framing of politics that does not focus as closely on the interests and 
influence of the very rich. What we mean by "beyond" is very much the latter. Like the 
great majority of scholars of contemporary Indonesian politics, all those present at the 
Sydney workshop are sensitive to the influence of material power in post-Suharto 
Indonesia. However, most of those participants do not explicitly work within the 
oligarchy framework, as proposed either by Winters or by Richard Robison and Vedi 
Hadiz. Instead, they emphasize other factors shaping Indonesian politics, including 
non-material sources of political power, the organization of oppositional forces, 
electoral institutions and the political incentives that they produce, and the craft and 
skill of Indonesia's political leaders. The debate, then, is over starting points and 
emphases. Is material power the fundamental driver of Indonesian politics? How 
should scholars approach non-material interests in the context of oligarchy?
The insights generated by scholars of oligarchy should be taken seriously. Indeed, 
the express purpose of the workshop was to challenge the assumption that scholars 
drawing on different theoretical traditions necessarily always operate within "parallel 
universes" when it comes to the study of politics in Southeast Asia.2 As the workshop 
demonstrated, this does not have to be the case. At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that—extensive citation of the work of Robison and Hadiz in contemporary 
research on Indonesian politics notwithstanding—there had been little productive 
exchange among proponents of the oligarchy thesis and scholars who adopt a different 
perspective. As a result, the literature risked becoming mired in stale, predictable, and 
unproductive pronouncements, rife with caricatures and misrepresentations, on all 
sides. In the absence of vigorous and genuine exchange, there is a danger that the field 
could evolve into a collection of inward-looking scholarly camps whose failure to 
engage seriously with the important theoretical and empirical contributions of those 
working in other traditions lessens its collective capacity to understand and theorize 
Indonesian politics. The purpose of the workshop, and of this special issue, is to 
promote such exchange.
Our experience in Sydney, and subsequently at the 2013 conference of the 
Association for Asian Studies (AAS) in San Diego, California, confirmed that these 
conversations best happen in person. Face-to-face interactions force us to take 
responsibility for our positions, and to respond to questions and challenges informed 
by different theoretical traditions in a way that written exchanges do not. The five 
essays in this collection—the output of those face-to-face discussions—represent 
distinctive statements about political power and material inequality in contemporary 
Indonesia. By publishing them as a collection, we seek to reclaim a tradition of focused 
debate about Indonesian politics at a time in which major works on post-New Order 
Indonesia have offered very different interpretations of the essential character of 
Indonesian democracy.
2 Richard Robison, "Interpreting the Politics of Southeast Asia: Debates in Parallel Universes," in Routledge 
Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics, ed. Richard Robison (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 5-22.
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Oligarchy: An Overview
The concept of oligarchy is associated with three major scholars of Indonesian 
politics: Vedi Hadiz, Richard Robison, and Jeffrey Winters. Robison and Hadiz's 
Reorganising Power: The Politics of Oligarchy in the Age of Markets3 and Winters's 
Oligarchy4 share an approach to Indonesian politics that emphasizes the primacy of 
material resources as a form of both economic and political power. These works are 
also theoretically distinctive, departing from the conceptualization of oligarchy that 
has emerged from the power elite and elite theory traditions within politics and 
sociology.5
A core feature of analyses of Indonesia using the oligarchy framework is the claim 
that democratization has changed the form of Indonesian politics without eliminating 
oligarchic rule. Both Winters and Robison and Hadiz accept that the formal structures 
of electoral democracy can coexist with oligarchic rule, most often where democracy 
exists in minimalist or procedural terms.6 Hadiz and Robison observe that oligarchy 
and procedural democracy are compatible, and find that meaningful elections have 
changed the behavior of oligarchs. Both analyses allow that democracy has had real 
effects on oligarchic rule, but deny that this implies that oligarchy is necessarily 
diminished by competitive elections. This point has important consequences for any 
evaluation of the quality of Indonesian democracy in the post-Suharto era. While the 
behaviors and strategies of oligarchs may have been modified by the imperatives of 
electoral democracy—and, indeed, by introduction of additional loci of decision­
making with the advent of decentralization—there is no institutional, electoral, or 
mobilizational "fix" to the problem of oligarchy. According to both Winters and 
Robison and Hadiz, the degree of political change needed to disrupt the nexus between 
wealth and political power in Indonesia (as elsewhere) is, in fact, no less than 
revolutionary.
The commonalities between Reorganising Power and Oligarchy notwithstanding, 
their understandings of how material inequality shapes Indonesian politics differ in 
several important ways. A close examination of these differences, therefore, is timely, 
not least because of the influence that these analyses exert. The approach offered by 
Robison and Hadiz in Reorganising Power and related work has been invoked in many 
interpretations of Indonesian politics since the fall of the New Order. Winters, 
meanwhile, has used his expertise as a scholar of Indonesian political economy to 
produce a work that has been recognized as a signature contribution to mainstream 
political science.7 As Winters's argument joins that of Robison and Hadiz in
3 Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of 
Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
4 Jeffrey Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
5 See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1956); and Gaetano Mosca, 
The Ruling Class, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939). As 
Winters argues, these works are departures from the classical understandings of oligarchy that originated 
in the works of Plato and Aristotle.
6 Adam Przeworski, "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense," in Democracy's Value, ed. Ian 
Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
7 In Winters's 2011 book, Indonesia constitutes one case study in a larger comparative exploration of 
oligarchies ranging from the prehistoric era, through classical Greece and Rome and medieval European, 
to contemporary treatments of Singapore, the Philippines, and the United States.
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characterizing oligarchy in Indonesia, it is important to recognize that, whatever their 
similarities, these arguments draw on different theoretical backgrounds and have 
different implications for the study of Indonesian politics.
The first and central difference between the two analyses of oligarchy lies in its 
definition. Both theses emphasize the key concept of wealth defense. Robison and 
Hadiz describe oligarchy as a "system of power relations that enables the 
concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defence,"8 and Winters as the 
"politics of wealth defense among materially endowed actors."9 But whereas Robison 
and Hadiz are decidedly neo-Marxist in their positioning of oligarchy within the 
development of global capitalism, Winters's emphasis is on the more Weberian 
concern of the role and locus of coercion in the politics of wealth defense. In other 
words, while both Robison and Hadiz and Winters understand oligarchy differently 
than do analysts of oligarchy, elite domination, and related phenomena working with 
the power elite tradition, they also understand it quite differently from one another. 
This fundamental difference has great consequences for the operationalization of 
wealth defense as a concept. For Hadiz and Robison, the collective nature of oligarchy 
is fundamental, as is the concurrence between conflicts over wealth and political 
authority. Winters's definition of oligarchy, by contrast, does not require collective 
behavior by oligarchs, nor the pursuit or defense of authority: these are possible, not 
necessary, implications of oligarchic rule.
Various other differences follow from these different conceptualizations of 
oligarchy. Most obviously, Oligarchy and Reorganising Power differ in their focus. 
Reorganising Power offers a deep analysis of the Indonesian case. In it, Robison and 
Hadiz argue that Indonesia's oligarchy is a condition of late capitalism in the periphery. 
Their historical discussion reveals that it is also a relatively recent development, dating 
to the late New Order period:
... the relationships between state authority and the bourgeoisie in Indonesia 
changed from a Bonapartist form in the early Suharto era to one that took an 
oligarchic form in the later New Order period. This was a state that had become 
the possession of its own officials and that acted to preserve its own institutional 
underpinnings and on behalf of major capitalist interests. Such a state was 
transformed to one that was defined by an increasing fusion of wealth and 
politico-bureaucratic power, articulated in the relationships and interminglings 
between the leading families of business and those of politics and the 
bureaucracy as they became enmeshed directly in the ownership and control of 
capital.10
This change in the relationship between wealth and political power over the course 
of the New Order suggests that capitalism does not always produce oligarchic rule. 
This contrasts with the comparative focus adopted by Winters, which positions 
oligarchy as a more general phenomenon. In Winters's analysis, oligarchy is a property 
of any social formation characterized by a very uneven distribution of material
8 Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison, this volume. It is worth noting that this most recent definition differs 
from that which they offered in Reorganising Power.
9 Winters, Oligarchy, p. 7.
10 Hadiz and Robison, this volume.
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resources. The central message from this conceptualization is that oligarchy manifests 
itself differently across epochs and political contexts.11 But insofar as capitalism 
produces extreme inequalities in wealth, it produces extreme inequalities in material 
power, and oligarchy is inevitably the result.
As applied to Indonesia, these approaches also differ in their primary unit of 
analysis. With his definition of oligarchy as the politics of wealth defense by materially 
endowed actors, Winters's analysis centers on individual actors who sometimes act 
collectively, but often do not. The emergence of various forms of oligarchy—warring, 
civil, sultanistic, and ruling—presented in Oligarchy is primarily determined by the 
different threats oligarchs face and how wealth defense is accomplished. Electoral 
politics is a possible channel for the exercise of power in the pursuit of wealth defense, 
and oligarchs may choose to support, sponsor, or even become political elites. But 
while "extreme material inequality necessarily produces extreme political inequality,"12 
it does not require that all individual oligarchs engage in the political sphere or hold 
positions of direct rule. This contrasts with Robison and Hadiz's emphasis on the 
collective system of power relations in Indonesia and the evolving relationship 
between the state and the bourgeoisie, which—returning to their definition of 
oligarchy—entails the fusion of wealth accumulation and political power from the late 
New Order period. Neither approach ultimately privileges structure over agency, but 
Winters's analysis of Indonesian politics places relatively more emphasis on agency 
than does the analysis by Robison and Hadiz.
The identity and importance of "outsiders" as a challenge to oligarchy also differs 
in the two approaches. The fusion of wealth accumulation and political power and the 
emphasis on the systemic aspects of oligarchy in Robison and Hadiz's 
conceptualization imply that outsiders are those who are not members of the politico- 
bureaucratic elite. Winters, by contrast, distinguishes between oligarchs and actors in 
the social formation who are able to muster substantial power resources other than 
material wealth and use them to threaten oligarchs' capacity to engage in wealth 
defense. Thus, like other kinds of non-oligarchic power contenders, "political elite" 
only becomes legible as an analytical category when its power resources are sufficient 
to threaten the material interests of the very wealthy, and are used for that purpose.
Both analyses invoke a similar caveat when it comes to "outsiders" who rely on 
mobilizational power. All three authors point to the disorganization and fragmentation 
of the Indonesian working class, and, indeed, of other oppositional forces.13 Yet the 
implications of this fragmentation differ for the two analyses. Class relations are a 
central problematique for Robison and Hadiz. In the Indonesian case, they argue, the 
working class is disempowered to an extent that it is unable to act in pursuit of its own 
interests either by itself or in alliance with the liberal middle class. Winters agrees that 
the Indonesian working class is insufficiently powerful to challenge the material 
resources of the oligarchs, but would argue that the working class is but one potential
11 Other forms of economic organization—feudalism, plantation agriculture, and many others—can also 
produce extreme wealth stratification, and thus oligarchy.
12 Winters, this volume.
13 Edward Aspinall, "A Nation in Fragments: Patronage and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia," 
Critical Asian Studies 45,1 (2013).
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vehicle for mobilizational power in Indonesia or elsewhere. In other words, where 
Robison and Hadiz understand working-class movements as the logical outcome of 
class-based exploitation, Winters chooses not to look to class but rather to 
mobilizational power—which may at times coincide with particular class formations— 
as a fundamentally different kind of power resource, which offers the possibility of 
explosive change but little else. This is so, he argues, because of the difficulty in 
sustaining a high level of mobilizational activity, but also because great material 
wealth can be used to purchase mobilizational and, indeed, other forms of power.
A final distinction between the two analyses of oligarchy lies in their scale or level 
of analysis. Winters's analysis uses examples from multiple jurisdictional levels of 
oligarchic power, but in the case of Indonesia offers little discussion of how to apply 
the concepts of oligarchic scale and intensity beyond Jakarta, or of how oligarchic 
power at different scales may interact. In some locations in the Indonesian periphery, 
including most obviously resource-rich regions, "national level" oligarchs have a direct 
interest and may seek direct influence. It is vital, however, also to pay careful attention 
to local oligarchs, whose existence is important to our understanding of local politics in 
both empirical and theoretical terms. The material resources of local oligarchs are 
almost always far less in absolute terms than those of the national level oligarchs. But 
they are focused in a particular place, and complemented by the other power resources 
generated as a consequence of their social and economic position in that locality. This 
is important theoretically for those who seek to understand the impact of material 
wealth on local politics and to account for the ways that the combination of power 
resources held by local oligarchs stacks up against the very partial deployment of the 
resources of much richer national oligarchs in that particular locality. Such discussion 
does not fault Winters's analysis of oligarchy—its focus on national politics is certainly 
reasonable given the comparative nature of his work—but being able to shift the scale 
down to local politics is necessary for any complete understanding of Indonesian 
politics.
By contrast, Hadiz and Robison address local politics in decentralized Indonesia 
directly. Observing that decentralization has created a new arena of political conflict, 
they argue that the local political-bureaucratic elite inherited from the New Order has 
found this arena to be productive for amassing material resources. Not surprisingly, 
then, those local elites use the authority conferred upon them through decentralization 
to defend both the wealth that they have accumulated and the opportunities to do so 
afforded to them by the political structures associated with decentralization. The 
challenge to this perspective on local oligarchy lies in the positioning of non-material 
power resources, which are acknowledged by Hadiz and Robison to be essential 
components of local power configurations, but not necessarily theorized.
These differences—in definition, focus, unit of analysis, treatment of outsiders, and 
scale—clearly delineate the two dominant understandings of oligarchy in 
contemporary scholarship on Indonesia. Of course, for reasons outlined above, it 
would be mistaken to overdraw these distinctions, for there are broad commonalities 
between these analyses. But as became clear among all participants at the Sydney 
workshop, critiques of Winters's conception of oligarchy are not necessarily critiques 
of Robison and Hadiz's, and vice versa. Careful demarcation of the distinctiveness of 
the two approaches, while acknowledging their deep similarities, is necessary to
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understand how oligarchy is employed as a way of understanding the importance of 
concentrated material wealth in Indonesia's political economy. A careful comparison of 
works by these authors allows for a better assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
of their general approach—focused on oligarchy—by other scholars working within 
and outside this tradition.
The Contributions
Winters's essay, which begins this special collection, outlines the key elements of 
his thesis of oligarchy as it applies to post-Suharto Indonesia. In it, Winters asserts that 
the dramatic changes brought about by democratization are real and important, but 
neither disrupted nor diminished oligarchic power. Rather, electoral democracy has 
been accompanied, he argues, by a shift from a sultanistic form of oligarchy, in which 
Suharto effectively set the rules of the oligarchic game, to a much less constrained 
"electoral ruling" form of oligarchy, in which oligarchs' strategies of wealth defense 
include an intense focus on the political realm. Winters concludes that this shift has 
been wildly successful, with oligarchs having "captured and now thoroughly 
dominat[ing] the country's democratic institutions."
While agreeing with Winters's conclusion that oligarchs dominate democratic 
Indonesia's political institutions, Hadiz and Robison's contribution offers a very 
different interpretation of the impact of Indonesia's transition to democracy on the 
form oligarchy takes. Where Winters identifies a dramatic shift in oligarchs' strategies 
of wealth defense (and consequently in oligarchic form), Hadiz and Robison argue that 
"the social order of the previous regime and its ascendant political forces remain intact 
and in charge of the state." Always central to their conceptualization of oligarchy, 
politico-bureaucratic power thus "continues to be the key determinant of how private 
wealth and social power is accumulated and distributed." Reformist individuals and 
new political vehicles may have emerged, but they have been quickly drawn into 
predatory politics, succumbing to a system shaped by an unchanging logic of oligarchy.
The three essays that follow offer analyses from scholars who bring different 
insights into Indonesian politics, and who represent different traditions in 
contemporary Indonesian political studies. R. William Liddle's essay acknowledges an 
imbalance of material resources, but advances an interpretation of Indonesian politics 
that prioritizes the actions of key individuals. Its main critique of the oligarchy 
framework in either form—either Winters's or Robison and Hadiz's—is that it 
prioritizes material power over other power resources, and obscures the craft that 
skillful politicians bring to bear in shaping the political arena. Like Winters, Liddle 
privileges agency. But where Winters is concerned with the cumulative effects of 
wealth defense by materially endowed actors, Liddle's ontology of the political centers 
on the individual and his or her ability to "create, mobilize, and deploy" political 
resources. In this way, individual actors can counteract constraints, which in the 
Indonesian context (as elsewhere in the modern world) necessarily include constraints 
imposed by those who possess great material wealth. His "theory of action" is a 
statement of what that analysis should become. It is equally a critique of approaches 
that focus on interest groups and social movements, to the extent that they privilege 
collective agency over the agency of the individual.
8 Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinsky
The key argument made in Thomas Pepinsky's essay is that a critical approach 
within the pluralist tradition offers a conceptual "toolkit" that allows us to move 
beyond the claims made about the intersection of material wealth and political power 
by the proponents of the oligarchy thesis towards causal accounts of its consequences 
for policymaking. Pepinsky characterizes his approach as a framework of analysis 
rather than a theory or description of Indonesian politics; a framework, he argues, can 
accommodate the key insights offered by each of the oligarchy theses while not being 
limited to them. At the core of his case lie two claims: that (a) critical pluralism has the 
capacity to produce hypotheses that can be falsified through empirical analysis; and 
that (b) the hypotheses it generates include, but are not limited to, hypotheses that test 
the link between political actions by or on behalf of those with great material wealth 
and the outcomes of contestations over policy. Therefore, unlike oligarchy, he contends, 
critical pluralism has the capacity to explain variation in policy outcomes under 
broadly similar structural conditions, and focuses on testing casual propositions 
derived from such explanations.
Edward Aspinall's essay also points to an analytical gap in the oligarchy thesis, 
namely the failure to acknowledge or theorize the role of mobilization and popular 
agency. As a consequence, he argues, scholars drawing on this framework have 
produced "mono-tonal characterizations of Indonesian politics" in the late New Order 
and Reformasi periods. Aspinall's key contention is that such characterizations do not 
recognize the influence of non-elite forces in shaping either regime change or post­
authoritarian politics, including through alliances with elements of the ruling elite. 
Importantly, such alliances do not merely signify opportunities for cooptation, but can 
also channel non-elite interests in the policymaking process. Aspinall is careful to 
acknowledge that extreme material inequality has political consequences. He also 
emphasizes that oppositional forces are fragmented and disorganized. He nevertheless 
concludes that because Indonesian politics is marked by contestation as much as it is 
by oligarchic domination, an analytical focus on domination alone can neither 
understand nor explain the history and trajectory of Indonesian politics.
As these brief reviews make clear, it would be inaccurate to describe the five essays 
as capturing a single debate between proponents and opponents of oligarchy in 
Indonesian politics. Neither do these essays track other familiar organizing principles 
in contemporary Indonesian political studies: political science versus area studies, 
North American versus Australian schools, basic methodological or epistemological 
divides (quantitative versus qualitative, rationalist versus interpretivist, or positivist 
versus realist, and so on).14 Rather, the essays by Aspinall, Liddle, and Pepinsky 
challenge the two oligarchy approaches on the grounds of their explanatory capacity 
(all three), their ontology of Indonesian politics (Aspinall, Liddle), their methodological 
orientation (Pepinsky), and the level of attention paid to non-material resources (all 
three). Aspinall, whose work most closely draws on comparative scholars of social 
movements and contentious politics, shares with Hadiz and Robison the emphasis on 
the disorganization and fragmentation of social forces as a fundamental characteristic
14 On these divides, see Thomas B. Pepinsky, "Context and Method in Southeast Asian Politics" (available 
at https: / / courses.cit.cornell.edu/tp253/docs/context_method.pdf, accessed August 6, 2013); "An 
Introduction to the State of Indonesian Political Studies," in Producing Indonesia: The State of the Field of 
Indonesian Studies, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Publications, forthcoming).
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of Indonesian democracy. Pepinsky's emphasis on the policy objectives of political 
actors distinguishes his pluralist approach from the other contributions, but his 
analysis nevertheless recognizes and accommodates the structural constraints 
articulated in the oligarchy thesis. His essay is also more closely aligned with the 
contemporary emphasis on falsifiability and causal explanation in the social sciences 
than are any of the other essays. Liddle's contribution has a distinctive focus on agency: 
while other contributors are attentive to individuals and their actions, only Liddle 
argues that individual choices must be seen as basic drivers of broad changes in 
Indonesian politics. In sum, just as the two oligarchy theses differ in critical ways, so, 
too, do the alternative frameworks offered here.
One of the distinctive features of an earlier generation of Indonesia scholarship15— 
one which we seek to emulate—was that it not only applied existing theoretical 
perspectives to Indonesia, but refined theories and concepts, and generated new ones, 
from a close understanding of the Indonesian case. In this way, area-focused analyses 
can contribute to broader disciplinary developments in political science and related 
fields, something that all contributors to this special issue agree is an essential goal. 
Together, these essays constitute a first step in that direction. They capture five 
distinctive perspectives on material inequality and democracy in contemporary 
Indonesia, and collectively represent the first truly open and critical exchange on this 
topic since the fall of the New Order. We hope and expect that they will spark further 
debate on Indonesian politics over coming years.
15 See, among others, Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin, eds., Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen 
Contributions to the Debate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1982); Karl D. Jackson 
and Lucian W. Pye, eds., Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1978).
